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Short-term memory (STM) refers to the capacity-limited retention of information over a
brief period of time, and working memory (WM) refers to the manipulation and use of
that information to guide behavior. In recent years it has become apparent that STM
and WM interact and overlap with other cognitive processes, including attention (the
selection of a subset of information for further processing) and long-term memory (LTM—
the encoding and retention of an effectively unlimited amount of information for a much
longer period of time). Broadly speaking, there have been two classes of memory models:
systems models, which posit distinct stores for STM and LTM (Atkinson and Shiffrin,
1968; Baddeley and Hitch, 1974); and state-based models, which posit a common store
with different activation states corresponding to STM and LTM (Cowan, 1995; McElree,
1996; Oberauer, 2002). In this paper, we will focus on state-based accounts of STM.
First, we will consider several theoretical models that postulate, based on considerable
behavioral evidence, that information in STM can exist in multiple representational
states. We will then consider how neural data from recent studies of STM can inform
and constrain these theoretical models. In the process we will highlight the inferential
advantage of multivariate, information-based analyses of neuroimaging data (fMRI and
electroencephalography (EEG)) over conventional activation-based analysis approaches
(Postle, in press). We will conclude by addressing lingering questions regarding the
fractionation of STM, highlighting differences between the attention to information vs.
the retention of information during brief memory delays.
Keywords: short-term memory, attention, representational states, multivariate pattern analysis, unattended
memory items
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the neural mechanisms that support the short-
term retention of information is a long-standing aim of cognitive
neuroscience. For many years, the landscape of memory research
was dominated by systems-based models that emphasized a divi-
sion between primary and secondary memory, with the former
corresponding to short-term memory (STM) and the latter to
long-term memory (LTM). Baddeley and Hitch (1974) codified
the idea of a system of distinct STM storage buffers in their
multiple component model (for a recent depiction, see Baddeley,
2003). These buffers operate on the principle of the temporary
activation of mental representations (as distinct from the “passive
trace” of LTM). The idea of elevated activity as the basis for
STM also has a long history in neuroscience, dating back at least
to Hebb (1949), and explicitly proposed by Goldman-Rakic and
colleagues (Funahashi et al., 1989) as a neural implementation of
the STM buffers of the multiple component model.
More recently, many researchers have recognized that a
system of STM buffers supported by an active trace cannot
parsimoniously accommodate the growing evidence for tight
links between attention, STM, and LTM (Ruchkin et al., 2003;
Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005; Postle, 2006). Newer state-
based models of STM have proposed that interactions between
attention and LTM may act as the basis of short-term retention
(Cowan, 1995; McElree, 1998; Oberauer, 2002). These models
conceptualize information in STM as existing in various states of
activation established by the allocation of attention. This review
will highlight how contemporary cognitive neuroscience research
is broadly consistent with these state-based models of STM, and
consider how the two literatures inform one another.
SHORT-TERMMEMORY (STM): THEORETICAL MODELS AND
BEHAVIOR
First, we will summarize three prominent theoretical accounts
which postulate that information in STM can be retained in
different states as defined by the interactions between attention
and LTM (Figure 1; Cowan, 1995; McElree, 1998; Oberauer,
2002). Cowan (1995) describes two distinct states in STM: a small,
capacity-limited state referred to as the focus of attention (FoA)
and a more expansive state referred to as the activated portion
of LTM (aLTM). In this model, the FoA corresponds to approx-
imately four chunks of information that one can hold in STM
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FIGURE 1 | Three state-based models of STM. In each of the three
models, the basis of STM representations is a network of LTM. In
Cowan’s (1995) model (A) a capacity-limited FoA selects up to four
items for further processing. Information that was recently selected by
the FoA remains activated (denoted by the gray-colored nodes), and is
termed the activated portion of LTM. Oberauer’s (2002) model (B)
includes a narrow FoA which can efficiently select information (item a)
from a highly activated region of direct access (containing items b and
c; we refer to this region of direct access as the “state of direct
access” (SDA) in this manuscript). After information becomes
deprioritized, it transitions to a state of activated LTM. McElree’s (1998)
model (C) posits a single-item FoA (containing item a), with all other
memory in a common state with smoothly varying levels of memory
strength.
using top-down attentional control at any moment in time. When
attention subsequently shifts to other information, the items that
were previously in the FoA transition into aLTM. aLTM has no
capacity limit per se, but is susceptible to temporal decay and
interference effects. A modification of this view was proposed by
Oberauer in the three-embedded-components theory (Oberauer,
2002, 2009). In this view, the four-item FoA from Cowan’s model
is recast as a region of direct access from which a narrower FoA can
efficiently select information. Capacity limits, per se, do not exist
for either of these two hypothesized states in STM. Rather, the
amount of information that can be retained in the direct-access
region and the FoA is limited only by interference from bindings
between object features being retained in STM (Oberauer, 2013).
A third model, advocated by McElree (1998, 2006), posits two
components of STM: a FoA with a strict capacity limit of one
item, and LTM, in which items are equally accessible, but can
differ in terms of “memory strength”. This model also allows for a
representation of how recently an item was in the FoA, a property
that we will equate to “activation” as defined in relation to the
other two models.
Although many of the ideas espoused by these models are
consistent, the terminology often is not. What Cowan calls the
FoA is called the direct-access region in Oberauer’s model (or,
more recently, the “broad focus” (Oberauer and Hein, 2012)).
Oberauer’s FoA has no direct equivalent in Cowan’s model,
although it is similar to McElree’s single-item FoA. In this review,
we will use the conventions of Oberauer’s model, with the
exception that we will refer to his “region of direct access” as a
“state of direct access” (SDA), to avoid confusion with anatomical
“regions” of the brain.
The three models summarized here have been developed to
explain extensive behavioral findings (reaction times and accu-
racies on tests of memory) suggesting the existence of differ-
ent states of representation in STM. For example, Oberauer
(2001, 2002, 2005) has made clever use of the Sternberg effect,
whereby reaction time (RT) for a recognition judgment about
a memory probe increases linearly with the number of items
concurrently held in memory. The Oberauer studies modified the
basic Sternberg memory paradigm by cuing the subject during a
brief memory delay that only a subset of the initially presented
memory items would be relevant for an upcoming probe. Given
sufficient time to react to these “retrocues”, subjects respond
more quickly to memory probes of the cued items. The uncued
items are not fully forgotten, however, and continue to influence
ongoing processing in the form of an intrusion effect on response
times (that is, slower response times) when they are presented as
negative (to-be-rejected) memory probes. This intrusion effect
persists for 5 s, long after the uncued items cease to affect
response times for the cued items. These items are hypothesized
to have been removed from the SDA into aLTM (Oberauer, 2001).
The existence of multiple states of STM in Oberauer’s model,
and the dynamic transitions between these states, were inferred
primarily from this set of results. Moreover, by varying the
retrocue-to-memory probe asynchrony it has been estimated that
it takes ∼1 s to remove uncued items from the SDA (Oberauer,
2005).
And what about the fate of the uncued memory items? A
recent study examined behavioral accuracy for probes to memory
items (in this example the memory items were colored circles)
that were not prioritized by a retrocue during the first portion
of the trial (Rerko and Oberauer, 2013). The authors used a
design in which two different retrocues appeared on each trial,
serving to sequentially signal the relevance of two different items
in memory—subjects knew that only the item indicated by the
last retrocue would actually be the target of a memory probe.
The recognition probe appearing after the second of these cues
therefore probed a memory item that was initially uncued. (There
were also trials with only a single retrocue followed by a probe; the
presence of these trials ensured that subjects indeed allocated their
attention to the item indicated by the first retrocue). Behavioral
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accuracy on the two-cue trials was statistically indistinguishable
from trials with only a single cue, suggesting that there is no loss of
memory strength for memory items that temporarily transitioned
out of the FoA after the initial retrocue. (We note, however, that
the interval between the first and second cue onsets was only 600
ms; given results from our own behavioral and neural studies
(LaRocque et al., 2013), this amount of time may not be sufficient
for an item to transition out of the FoA before the onset of the
second cue).
In contrast to these findings, which provide support for
multiple-state models of STM (Cowan, 1995; Oberauer, 2005),
other studies have suggested that STM comprises only one distinct
component, the FoA, within a network of memory that is not
qualitatively different from the myriad memories stored in LTM
(McElree, 1998, 2006). In this formulation, the emphasis is on
memory strength and retrieval speed. The studies in support of
this view have employed behavioral tasks with serially presented
memory items, under the assumption that the last item presented
before the memory probe would be maintained in a FoA (McElree
and Dosher, 1989). By playing a tone to signal when subjects
could respond to the memory probe, the authors attempted to
control speed-accuracy trade-offs that are omnipresent in behav-
ioral paradigms with speeded responses. In these experiments, the
memory strength (measured by the asymptotic accuracy reached
at long probe-tone intervals) decreased monotonically as a func-
tion of the serial position at which the probed memory item was
presented. For example, in a six-item trial, the second item pre-
sented had lower memory strength than the fifth item according
to these measures of response accuracy. In contrast, the retrieval
speed, measured by the rate constant of the fit between accuracy
and response time at varying probe-tone intervals, was the same
across all memory items except for the most recent item. From this
pattern of results, McElree has argued that only the last item in the
list of STM items can be held in the FoA; all other items are main-
tained as discrete “events” in LTM with varying levels of memory
strength, while sharing identical retrieval dynamics. In McElree’s
words, “[R]etrieval from what is traditionally thought to be work-
ing memory (WM) is mediated by the same mechanism that is
typically argued to underlie retrieval from LTM” (McElree, 2006).
To summarize, state-based models posit that STM perfor-
mance is accomplished via the activation of LTM representations,
with information that is “in mind” being held in a FoA, and
recently attended items having a level of activation that is greater
than the basal level of information in LTM. Two important points
where these models diverge is on the capacity of the FoA (-1 item
vs. many), and whether or not there is a qualitative distinction
between states in STM outside the FoA and the remainder of
LTM. We will return to these questions near the end of this
review, to consider whether the neuroimaging findings that are
the focus of this review might help adjudicate between these
different theoretical propositions.
NEURAL ACTIVATION AND REPRESENTATIONAL STATES IN
SHORT-TERMMEMORY (STM)
We preface this section by noting that fMRI has been used to
validate the general idea that STM can be supported via the
temporary activation of LTM representations: a multivariate
classifier trained to discriminate three categories of information
from LTM can decode the category of information being
maintained during a test of STM (Lewis-Peacock and Postle,
2008). This study, however, did not address the distinct retention
states proposed by the theoretical models reviewed above. The
remainder of this review will consider more recent studies that
have been explicitly designed to seek neural correlates of these
different hypothesized states of representation in STM. We will
categorize these studies by methodological strategy: those that
assess the neural signal associated with the memory probe, and
those that assess the neural signal associated with the delay-period
during tests of STM.
PROBE-BASED NEUROIMAGING STUDIES
The empirical studies reviewed in the Section Short-term Mem-
ory: Theoretical Models and Behavior all relied on behavioral
performance metrics on tests of STM as proxies for the represen-
tational state of items being held in STM. In addition to exam-
ining response times to memory probes, neuroimaging studies
can make inferences about representational states by evaluating
probe-evoked neural signal. For example, Nee and Jonides (2008)
used a paradigm in which subjects were presented with a series
of three words followed 300 ms later by a recognition probe.
They reasoned, like McElree (2006), that probes matching the
most recently presented word (the “-1 item”) would test sub-
jects’ memory performance for an item held inside the FoA,
whereas probes matching earlier stimuli (“-2” and “-3” items)
would test their memory performance for items held outside
the FoA (thus, probes of these items would require retrieval of
these items back into the FoA). They found that the blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response in the anterior infe-
rior temporal cortex was greater for probes matching the -1
item than for probes matching the -2 and -3 items. They also
found increased activation of the medial temporal lobe (MTL)
and left mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) for probes
matching the -2 and -3 items, compared to probes matching the -1
item. In a more fine-grained distinction, they found enhanced
functional connectivity between inferior temporal cortex and
both right vlPFC and left posterior parietal cortex for probes
matching -1 items vs. probes matching -2 items. This difference
was interpreted as a neural dissociation between the retrieval of
items inside vs. outside the FoA in STM. Later work from the
same group replicated and extended this result by expanding the
list of items to be remembered on each trial from 3 to 6 items (Nee
and Jonides, 2011, 2013). The authors attempted to dissociate
three putative states of STM by comparing neural activity evoked
by probes targeting items presented at different serial positions
in the list: the FoA (the -1 item), the state of direct access
(the -2 and -3 items), and the activated portion of LTM (the -4
and -5 items). Their results highlighted brain regions whose
probe-evoked activity differed between these different probe types
(Nee and Jonides, 2011). Left posterior superior temporal gyrus,
left posterior parietal cortex, and left anterior inferior temporal
cortex were associated with retrieval of information from the
FoA (findings in the latter two regions replicated previous work
(Nee and Jonides, 2008)). Right hippocampus was associated
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with retrieval from the SDA (previously, left parahippocampal
and entorhinal cortex was associated with retrieval from the
SDA (Nee and Jonides, 2008)). Finally, left inferior frontal gyrus
was associated with retrieval from aLTM. Despite the compelling
triple dissociation in probe-evoked activity, these data provide
only indirect evidence for distinct “states of representation” in
STM, because they do not measure neural signals associated with
the retention, per se, of information in these hypothesized states
of STM.
In contrast to these results, other probe-based studies have
failed to find evidence for an SDA. Oztekin et al. (2010) collected
fMRI data from subjects performing an STM task for 12 serially
presented items, using the same logic as before to assume that
the most recently presented item was in the FoA (Oztekin et al.,
2010). Their primary question was whether the hippocampus,
as a marker of LTM retrieval (Talmi et al., 2005), would show
increasing probe-evoked activity for items at early positions on
the stimulus presentation list. Because those earlier-presented
items could be considered to be retained outside Oberauer’s
SDA, the authors envisioned that earlier-presented items might
therefore be in LTM and more reliant on the hippocampus for
retrieval. In contrast to that scenario, they found that activity in
the hippocampus was actually higher for probes to -2, -3 and -4
items, which were presumably in the SDA, compared with probes
to -5 through -11 items. The authors ascribe two interpretations
to these results: (1) retrieval from WM as well as LTM requires
MTL activity, suggesting a common store; (2) MTL activity may
be a better metric of memory strength than of LTM access, per
se. Intriguingly, no brain regions showed increased probe-evoked
activation for the early list items compared with the -2, -3 and -4
items. Most notably, they did not replicate the Nee and Jonides
(2011) finding of heightened left inferior frontal gyrus activity
for this contrast. However, the evoked activity from probes to
the -2, -3 and -4 items was significantly higher than activity
evoked by probes to early-list items in the left supramarginal
gyrus (Oztekin et al., 2010); this result agrees qualitatively with
the pattern observed in Nee and Jonides (2011), wherein probe-
evoked activity in the left supramarginal gyrus can be seen to
decrease with probes of items putatively in the FoA, the SDA, and
aLTM, respectively.
From this summary, it is clear that the pattern of findings in
the “probe-based” literature is inconclusive with regard to the
theoretical models that motivated them. Additionally, we believe
that this type of design suffers from shortcomings that limit, a
priori, the inferences that it can support. Namely, the “probe-
based” approach relies on the underlying assumption that probes
matching items putatively stored in distinct representational states
should evoke differential BOLD activation. As we noted earlier,
such activity is not a direct measure of neural representations,
per se, in STM. Furthermore, such differences in probe-evoked
activity are not specific to one stimulus type, leaving open the
possibility that the observed differences may be due to some
factor other than stimulus representation, such as task difficulty
or effort. A final note about these experiments is that the observed
neural signals can be interpreted as reflecting two separate factors:
(1) the reorienting of attention to the information being probed;
and (2) the decision process required to respond accurately to the
probe. We will now discuss a second category of neuroimaging
studies, those designed to measure the state of activation of
mnemonic representations during the memory delay, when the
neural signal would presumably be less susceptible to contamina-
tion by other cognitive processes.
DELAY-BASED NEUROIMAGING STUDIES
Univariate analyses of different states in short-term memory (STM)
Intimately related to the debate over representation states in STM
is the question of what might differentiate representations in
STM from perceptual representations. After all, recent theoreti-
cal accounts have posited that the representational substrate for
information in STM may reside in sensory cortices (Pasternak
and Greenlee, 2005; Postle, 2006), and it is unequivocal that
neuronal mechanisms necessary for representing stimulus infor-
mation can be found in sensory cortices. Though theoretical
models typically ascribe STM representation to the activation
of previously latent LTM resources, a similar argument can be
made for perceptual representations (Fuster, 2003). Nobre et al.
(2004) have addressed this question by examining the neural
differences between allocating attention to external stimuli vs.
allocating attention to information already being held in STM.
They used a task paradigm in which the location of a relevant
memory item was provided via a spatial cue, which could be
delivered either before (precue) or after (retrocue) the memory
items were presented (Griffin and Nobre, 2003). Whereas the
precue would allow for the pre-allocation of spatial attention
in anticipation of the display of the memory items (externally
oriented attention), the retrocue, occurring after stimulus pre-
sentation, would require attentional allocation to items retained
in STM (internally oriented attention). The analysis of electroen-
cephalography (EEG) data recorded while subjects performed this
task revealed that the cue-evoked event-related potentials (ERPs)
in both conditions revealed a common marker of attentional
allocation: a negative deflection (the N1 component) in voltage
recordings from posterior electrodes, greater in magnitude in the
electrodes contralateral to the attended spatial location than in
ipsilateral electrodes. In comparing the retrocue and precue trials,
an ERP difference extending from frontal to posterior electrodes
was observed between 200 and 400 ms after the presentation of
the cue. This was interpreted as reflecting the engagement of
additional frontal cortical regions when the target of attentional
allocation was an internal representation vs. an external stim-
ulus. Subsequent fMRI studies confirmed this result by finding
enhanced activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal
cortex for retrocues vs. precues (Nobre et al., 2004). Two primary
conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the simi-
lar ERPs over posterior electrodes for internally and externally
oriented attention suggest a common site of the allocation of
attention. This is in agreement with the suggestion that STM
representations and perceptual representations might rely on the
same cortical regions (specifically, sensory cortex). Second, the
engagement of additional prefrontal and parietal cortical regions
for internally directed attention vs. externally directed attention
suggests that those regions’ roles might be specific to manipulat-
ing representations in STM. These regions are highly overlapping
with those identified by many previous studies of neural activity
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during STM tasks (D’Esposito et al., 2000; Curtis and D’Esposito,
2003). The observation that these regions are preferentially active
during shifts of attention to items in STM provides a possible
explanation of the function of activity in these regions in previous
studies of STM; namely, that it may also reflect the allocation of
attention to representations in STM.
However, for questions regarding the allocation of attention to
individual items in memory, these results from Nobre et al. (2004)
are limited because they collapse across all stimuli; therefore, their
description of attention allocation is necessarily a generalized
one. A follow-up study attempted to address the question of how
attention to a specific representation in STM might be manifested
in neural activity (Lepsien and Nobre, 2007). The difficulty to be
overcome by this study was how to assay neural activity related
to allocating attention to one of two stimuli in STM. To do so,
the authors took advantage of early findings of different neu-
roanatomical loci of neural activity during the viewing of pictures
of houses vs. faces: specifically, neural activity in the fusiform
gyrus is higher when viewing pictures of faces than pictures of
houses, and the opposite pattern is seen in the parahippocampal
gyrus (Mccarthy et al., 1996; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Aguirre
et al., 1998). Subjects were tasked with remembering two stimuli
on each trial, one house and one face. After the pictures disap-
peared from the display, a cue appeared indicating which item
would be relevant for an upcoming memory probe. The neural
activity in region of interests (ROIs) separately determined to be
responsive to faces and houses increased (or decreased) when the
cues indicated that the ROI’s preferred category was relevant (or
irrelevant). This result can be taken as supportive of separate levels
of activation corresponding to attended and unattended items in
STM. It also is in agreement with the idea that regions engaged in
the perception of a stimulus might also be involved in the short-
term storage of that stimulus type.
More recently, a thematically similar follow-up study, using
umbrella-like cartoon images as memory items and a retrocuing
design, observed neural activity after a retrocue related to the
set size of the uncued memory set (Trapp and Lepsien, 2012).
This effect was found in posterior intraparietal sulcus. In contrast,
delay-period BOLD signal in anterior intraparietal sulcus only
showed a load effect on trials with an uninformative retrocue
that selected all memory items as relevant. On trials with a
retrocue signaling one item that would to be probed, there was no
load effect in anterior intraparietal sulcus, whereas a load effect
persisted in posterior intraparietal sulcus. This pattern of results
led the authors to suggest a posterior vs. anterior division in
intraparietal sulcus between mnemonic vs. attentional functions,
respectively. This result is notable because it can be interpreted
as a neural signature of STM representations after they have
transitioned from the SDA into aLTM. Recent developments in
neuroimaging data analysis, the focus of the next subsection,
mean that the interpretations drawn from some of the studies
reviewed in this subsection may need to be reconsidered.
Multivariate analyses of neural representations
The neuroimaging studies reviewed to this point attempted to
infer the existence (or non-existence) of various representational
states in memory, or their relation to perceptual representations,
based on differences in BOLD signal magnitude or location.
The premise of this reasoning is that if the activation state of
a neural representation varied as a result of an experimental
manipulation, the corresponding level of fMRI signal intensity
would vary in a congruent manner. However, recent advances in
our thinking about the multivariate nature of neuroimaging data
sets has brought about a renewed appreciation for the fact that
this “signal intensity-based” reasoning also supports only indirect
inference with regard to assaying active neural representations
(Postle, in press). An approach that is maximally sensitive to
the information contained in patterns of neural activity should
provide a more direct measure of neural representations (Tong
and Pratte, 2012; Davis and Poldrack, 2013). Recently, several
studies have attempted to characterize neural representations in
different states of STM by using multivariate pattern analysis
(MVPA; e.g., Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes and Rees, 2006; Norman
et al., 2006). This approach provides more inferential power due
to its greater sensitivity at detecting information in neural signals.
This increased sensitivity is illustrated by studies that have found
stimulus-specific patterns of activity in early visual cortex during
the delay period of a visual STM task, despite the absence of
elevated delay-period activity in the same regions (Harrison and
Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 2009; Riggall and Postle, 2012; Han
et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2013). Similar results have been reported for
decoding the frequency of auditory memory items from primary
auditory cortex (Linke et al., 2011). The sensitivity of MVPA is
further exemplified by a recent study that used MVPA to demon-
strate a lack of specificity in univariate analyses of the BOLD
signal (Lewis-Peacock and Postle, 2012). They demonstrated that
that putative “category-selective” brain regions showing elevated
delayed period activity during the STM retention of one category
of information nonetheless carried patterns of activity associated
with another category of information (specifically, the category
currently relevant for behavior).
The possibility that signal intensity-based and MVPA methods
might provide qualitatively different conclusions about neural
function invites reconsideration of studies relying on the former
strategy. In particular, there is a long history of studies identifying
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex as the
representational substrates in STM, based largely on the observa-
tion of sustained, elevated signal during the delay period of STM
tasks (as reviewed, e.g., in Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003; Todd and
Marois, 2004). Recently, several studies have explicitly tested the
representational capacity of brain regions exhibiting sustained,
elevated delay period activity, and have shown that stimulus
information (the stimuli were arrays of coherently moving dots)
could not be decoded from the delay-period BOLD signal in such
regions (Riggall and Postle, 2012; Emrich et al., 2013). In contrast,
stimulus identity could be decoded from visual cortex and area
MT+, regions which did not exhibit a sustained, elevated response
during the delay period. These failures to decode stimulus identity
from parietal and prefrontal cortex (Riggall and Postle, 2012;
Emrich et al., 2013) leave open the question of what might be the
function of the sustained, elevated activity observed during STM
delay periods; they also call into question the interpretation of
previous studies that relied on elevated activity to make inferences
about representational states in STM (Griffin and Nobre, 2003;
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Nobre et al., 2004; Lepsien and Nobre, 2007; Nee and Jonides,
2008, 2011; Oztekin et al., 2010). We will next discuss several
studies that have addressed this issue within the frameworks
of Cowan, Oberauer and McElree, testing their assertions that
information in STM can be retained in various states that differ
according to the level of activation of LTM representations.
The first study (Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012) employed a
dual-response STM task with retrocuing adapted from Oberauer
(2005). Each trial began with the presentation of two stimuli
drawn from different categories (the categories were pairs of
line segments, pronounceable non-words, and words). After
an initial delay period, a retrocue appeared to signal which of
the two memory items would be the target of the first memory
probe. A second delay period followed, during which subjects
had to retain both the cued item and the uncued item in
memory. Subjects were instructed to respond to a memory
probe according to instructions designed to encourage different
formats of STM retention for the three categories of stimuli: (1)
subjects had to make an orientation judgment for line segments
(“visual” STM); (2) a synonym judgment for words (“semantic”
STM), and a rhyme judgment for pseudowords (“phonological”
STM); and (3) These different criteria were selected to enable
maximally sensitive decoding of the stimulus categories, especially
important because items from two categories would need to be
simultaneously retained. Both items had to be retained even in
the delay period after the first retrocue, because on each trial, after
the first memory probe, a second retrocue appeared that would
indicate, with equal probability, that either the initially cued (on
“cue-repeat” trials) or the initially uncued (on “cue-switch” trials)
memory item would be relevant for the second memory probe.
This manipulation created a situation during the delay period
following the first cue in which two items had to be remembered,
but only one item was prioritized by the retrocue. Based on
Oberauer (2005) and our own (LaRocque et al., 2013) behavioral
work, we assumed that the cued item was in the FoA (we refer
to such an item as an “attended memory item”, or AMI). The
uncued, but still retained, item was assumed to be held outside
the FoA (an “unattended memory item”, or UMI). In Oberauer’s
studies, the fate of the uncued memory set was to transition from
the SDA into aLTM (Oberauer, 2005; Oberauer and Hein, 2012).
Therefore, we consider the UMI in our studies to also be in aLTM.
In order to separately assay the neural representations of
the two memory items, a pattern classification approach was
used. The pattern classifiers were trained on a simple one-item
STM task using stimuli drawn from the same three categories.
After validating the classifiers’ performance at distinguishing the
single-item trials with line segments vs. non-words vs. words,
the classifiers were then applied to neural activity from the two-
item retrocuing task. The dependent measure of interest was the
classifier evidence for each of the three categories. Mathematically,
it is the inner product of the feature weights (fixed by training on
the one-item task data) by the feature values (the z-scored BOLD
signal in corresponding voxels from the two-item task). Classifier
evidence reflects the correspondence of the new brain data with
the distinct patterns of brain data on which the classifier was
trained; thus, it can be construed as an estimate of the presence of
the pattern of neural activity specific to the category of interest. In
the initial delay period, before any cues were presented, classifier
evidence for the categories of the two items presented on each trial
was significantly higher than the evidence for the non-present
category (i.e., the classifier’s evidence for the stimulus category
not presented on each trial served as a trial-by-trial baseline).
After the appearance of the first retrocue, evidence for the AMI’s
category remained high, but evidence for the UMI’s category
dropped to baseline (Figure 2A). On cue-repeat trials, this
pattern was reproduced following the second retrocue. However,
on cue-switch trials, the strong evidence for the initially cued
category dropped quickly to baseline and the classifier evidence
for the newly cued category rose precipitously and remained
elevated for the duration of the final delay period. These results
suggest that an active neural representation is only present for
items in STM when they are potentially relevant for a behavioral
response, and thus putatively held in the FoA. Provocatively, the
results also suggest that UMIs, although presumed to be in aLTM,
may not be maintained via active neural representations, though
evidence for their active neural representation can be restored
when UMIs are cued to become AMIs.
One important caveat about the results of Lewis-Peacock et al.
(2012) is that they are derived from the BOLD signal. It is
possible, however, that UMIs may be retained in an active state
to which the BOLD signal is insensitive. This objection is not
merely theoretical; recent studies have shown, for example, that
in the same individuals performing the same task, the BOLD
signal can be shown to be insensitive to perceptually suppressed
stimuli to which high-frequency neural oscillations are sensitive
(Maier et al., 2008). Indeed, many studies have shown that neural
oscillations across populations of neurons are sensitive to the
short-term retention of information (Jensen and Tesche, 2002;
Fuentemilla et al., 2010; Simanova et al., 2010). Therefore, we
sought to replicate the important features of the Lewis-Peacock
et al. (2012) study while assaying neural activity with EEG, a tech-
nique sensitive to neural oscillations. This study was also notable
for its attempt to decode stimulus information from delay-period
oscillatory neural activity, a challenging design which is only
slowly being adopted (for a recent review, see Jafarpour et al.,
2013). The classifiers used in this study were trained and tested
on frequency-transformed EEG data, allowing us to assay the
information present in patterns of oscillatory signals. In this
conceptual replication, evidence for active neural representations
was found for AMIs but not for UMIs; classifier evidence for the
latter was indistinguishable from baseline (Figure 2B). However,
when a UMI was cued as relevant for the next memory probe,
its active neural activity pattern was reinstated and, behaviorally,
subjects were able to respond accurately to probes of these items.
With the higher temporal resolution afforded by EEG, we
were also able to estimate a time-course of the loss of classifier
evidence (i.e., evidence for an active neural representation) for
the UMI following the retrocue. By approximately 1.25 s after the
onset of the retrocue, evidence for the UMI was indistinguishable
from baseline. This provides a neural counterpart to behavioral
evidence suggesting that approximately 1 s is needed between
the retrocue and the memory probe in order to observe the RT
benefit of a retrocue (LaRocque et al., 2013). These metrics can
be construed as characterizing the time needed for an item to
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FIGURE 2 | Decoding of attended and UMIs. Shown are the decoding
results from Lewis-Peacock et al. (2012) (A) and LaRocque et al. (2013) (B) on
cue-switch trials. In both figures, classifier evidence for the stimulus category
is plotted as a function of time, with the timing of events in the trial indicated
by geometric shapes on the x-axis (circles indicate stimulus presentation,
triangles indicate the cues, and squares indicate the memory probes). The
color scheme indicates the categories with respect to the cues: cued (red) is
the category indicated by the first cue, uncued (blue) is the category of the
other stimulus which is not selected by the first cue, and absent (gray) is the
category not present on that trial.
transition from the FoA into a less prioritized STM state, such
as aLTM (Oberauer, 2005).
Another important analysis was performed in the EEG dataset
to address the possibility that UMIs may be accompanied by a
neural representation different from AMIs, but equally active in
a neurophysiological sense (LaRocque et al., 2013). After all, a
potential objection to our strategy of training classifiers on a
one-item memory task before using them to assay AMIs and
UMIs is that, in the one-item task, attention was not explicitly
controlled. Subjects were therefore free to (and probably did)
allocate attention to the one item being retained, in which case the
item would be considered an AMI. If AMIs and UMIs are indeed
maintained in a qualitatively different manner, then it follows that
a classifier trained on AMIs might fail to detect UMIs. Therefore,
we performed a separate classification analysis using only data
from the two-item task to test this idea. We trained a classifier
to predict, on each trial, whether a line segment stimulus was
present (the line segment category was used because it was the one
for which classification was most accurate, and therefore afforded
the greatest sensitivity), separately for trials when a line segments
were AMIs and when they were UMIs. We could only correctly
classify the presence of line segment stimuli when they were AMIs.
This indicated that there was no reliable difference between delay-
period activity patterns from trials with line segments as a UMI
and delay period activity patterns from trials in which no line
segments had been presented; no evidence was found for an
“alternative”, but active, form of neural representation for UMIs.
In considering the results of the Emrich et al. (2013) and
Lewis-Peacock et al. (2012) studies, one might wonder if there
is a contradiction in the MVPA results. In the former study,
we found changes in classifier evidence that correlated with the
precision of subjects’ memory, whereas in the latter we found a
binary distinction, in that category-level classifier evidence was
present only for AMIs, and not for UMIs. We believe that these
results do not conflict because of the difference between category-
and item-level decoding. On the one hand, classifier evidence
obtained from decoding at the item level reflects quality of a
stimulus representation. However, it is unclear if such a result
should be expected to hold for category-level decoding. Consider,
for example, the case for a trial in which a subject has a slightly
inaccurate memory, and therefore an imprecise representation in
STM, of the meaning of a word; would that affect the extent to
which a word’s meaning-specific pattern of neural activity would
be present, as opposed to line segment- and pseudoword-specific
patterns? It seems possible that having a semantic representation
in STM, whether it is precise or imprecise, could produce strong
category-level patterns of bran activity. The broader concern still
exists, however: what is the difference between decoding at the
item level and at the category level? On the one hand, both
approaches should assay active neural representations, because
the neural representation of any given memory item should differ
both from the representations of other within-category items and
from items in different categories. If either of these distinctions
were absent, then it would be difficult to argue that stimulus
information was being actively represented. However, there are
likely many more factors differentiating the cognitive states asso-
ciated with remembering items from two different categories than
remembering items from within the same category. Taking houses
and faces as an example, it is easy to convince oneself that there
may be differences in the cognitive processing accompanying
memory for faces as compared to houses; e.g., if a house makes
one think of real estate prices because of an impending home
purchase, whereas an image of a staring face reminds one of
celebrity mug shots seen on the cover of a trashy periodical,
then neural activity predicting the retention of a face vs. a house
in memory may be due to these accessory details rather than
the stimulus properties. This is, of course, a general problem of
psychological experiments. Completely controlling the cognitive
activity of a subject is impossible. This does suggest, however, that
item-level decoding of BOLD signal is likely to be successful in a
more specific set of brain areas than category-level decoding. It is
difficult to imagine that there are different emotional saliencies
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associated with, e.g., dots moving 37◦ vs. 157◦ clockwise of
vertical.
In the final study we will consider that explicitly sought neural
correlates of representational states in STM (Nelissen et al., 2013),
subjects were presented with two items to remember on each
trial. These items were images drawn from different categories,
which included faces, bodies, and houses. After a brief initial
delay, subjects were provided a cue indicating which of the two
items would be relevant for an upcoming recognition probe array.
The BOLD signal following this cue was decoded using classifiers
trained on a visual perception condition in which subjects viewed
images drawn from the same three categories. The authors found
that in occipitotemporal cortex, the evidence for the cued cate-
gory remained above baseline following the cue, while evidence
for the uncued category (the UMI) dropped, in agreement with
our results (Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012; LaRocque et al., 2013).
Intriguingly, the UMI evidence in Nelissen et al. (2013) actually
dropped below the baseline represented by the classifier’s evidence
for the non-present category. However, a crucial detail is that
subjects were able to completely forget the uncued memory item,
because only a single probe display, targeting the cued item,
appeared on each trial. Additionally, the uncued item’s category
was present in the probe array, perhaps encouraging subjects to
adopt a strategy of active suppression. Nonetheless, the overall
pattern of results, obtained from a classifier trained on stimulus
perception trials, is supportive of the primary role of attention
in determining whether the contents of STM can be decoded
from delay-period neural activity, and therefore whether there is
evidence for the active neural representation of items in STM.
SHORT-TERMMEMORY (STM) AND VISUAL SEARCH
The cognitive construct of STM overlaps extensively with other
cognitive constructs; indeed, it has been argued that some very
transient form of STM is necessary even for the continuity of
conscious experience (Edelman, 1989). One important area of
overlap is with the construct of visual search. Both STM and visual
search studies typically use behavioral paradigms that require
subjects to transiently retain information about a stimulus in
order to recognize and/or respond to that stimulus when it is re-
presented at some later time. Visual search tasks often entail the
detection of a memory item in an array of many (>4) new probe
items. Although different terminology may be used (STM items
vs. search templates), the behavioral phenomena being studied
in the STM tasks and the visual search tasks are arguably very
similar. This similarity was recently highlighted by the discovery
of contralateral delay activity (CDA)—an electrophysiological
marker that has been observed with the short-term retention of
lateralized visual information—during the performance of visual
search tasks (Emrich et al., 2009; Carlisle et al., 2011). The CDA
is the difference in voltage between posterior electrodes contra-
and ipsilateral to the visual field in which the memory items were
presented. The magnitude of the CDA reflects the number of
items being held in STM (up to an individual’s memory capacity),
and it seems to be sustained throughout the delay period of STM
tasks (Vogel et al., 2005). In the Carlisle et al. (2011) study, a
CDA was observed when a search target was presented to one
side of central fixation. With each successive trial searching for
the same target stimulus, the magnitude of the CDA decreased.
The authors interpreted this as the offloading of an “attentional
template” from WM to LTM. This result is consistent with our
own finding that active neural representations of UMIs are not
evident in either fMRI or EEG recordings, and it raises the
question of whether an offloaded “attentional template” differs
in any meaningful way from our construct of an “UMI”. The
suggestion that LTM resources can be used to support retention
of an item outside WM is similar to the notion that items outside
the SDA rely on activated LTM. However, we suggest that the
presence or absence of above-threshold neural signals should not
be used as the criterion for considering a process to recruit “STM”
or “LTM” resources. We will return to this point later when we
discuss alternate mechanisms of short-term retention besides one
relying on elevated neural activity.
The Carlisle et al. (2011) result provides an opportunity to
more deeply consider several issues. We have trumpeted the
advantages of using a multivariate approach to identify stimulus-
specific signals when attempting to measure active neural rep-
resentations. In considering the Carlisle et al. (2011) results, the
non-specificity of the CDA makes it difficult to interpret a reduc-
tion in its magnitude. Is the CDA a marker of STM retention?
Or does it track active neural representations, which we posit are
only present for STM items currently in the FoA? Though there
are data inconsistent with some non-mnemonic interpretations
of the CDA (Ikkai et al., 2010), the CDA has been shown to
reflect object-tracking (Drew and Vogel, 2008) and to have a
higher magnitude in an object-tracking condition vs. a memory
condition for those same objects’ starting locations (Drew et al.,
2011). These latter two results suggest that the CDA may index
demands placed on attention. Yet another interpretation is sug-
gested by results from a recent WM training study. In this study,
participants completed daily cognitive training on an N-back
WM task. After 5 weeks of training, subjects showed improved
performance on the task, and this improvement was accompanied
by a reduced CDA magnitude on both visual STM and visual
search tasks compared to a pre-training experiment (Kundu et al.,
2013). This result suggests that a reduction in the amplitude of the
CDA may reflect increased efficiency of stimulus coding. The data
are less consistent with an interpretation in which the reduction in
CDA is accounted for by the increased utilization of LTM, because
the memory items were not repeated across consecutive trials as
they were in Carlisle et al. (2011). Therefore, it may be premature
to suggest that a reduction of the CDA signifies the removal
of an attentional template from WM. One way of adjudicating
among the various interpretations of the reduction in CDA seen
in Carlisle et al. (2011) would be to apply pattern classifiers to
those data to test whether the classifier’s assessment of the strength
of the attentional template would decrease in lockstep with the
shrinking CDA. If so, this would provide confirmatory evidence
that the active neural representation of the search template is
being shifted to a less active state in memory, perhaps one relying
more on LTM resources and less on attentional or STM resources.
Another visual search study has addressed the question of
whether the neural representations of memory items remained
active when those items were no longer in the FoA (Peters et al.,
2012). In this study, subjects were presented with two stimuli,
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which were always pictures of faces or houses. After a brief delay, a
retrocue indicated which of the two stimuli would be relevant for
an upcoming serial search task. In this task, merged transparent
images, each containing overlaid face and house images, were
presented rapidly; the task was to indicate with a button press
if one of the images exactly matched the stimulus that had been
indicated by the retrocue. Note that, for successful task perfor-
mance, the uncued memory item still had to be remembered even
though it was irrelevant for the first visual search, because it would
become the search template for a subsequent stream of images.
In contrast to the absence of evidence for active representation
of a UMI as reported in the Lewis-Peacock et al. (2012) study,
decoding of the category of the irrelevant memory item was
successful in no less than 17 distinct clusters of voxels. Upon first
consideration, this result might seem to be problematic for our
account that UMIs are not accompanied by an active trace. There
are, however, a few methodological differences that may account
for the disparate results. The first is that in the Peters et al. (2012)
study, the UMI always became relevant for the second half of
each trial; in our own experiments, the UMI subsequently became
relevant on only half of the trials. The second methodological
difference is that, in the Peters et al. (2012) study, the uncued
memory item actually appeared in the search stream on half of
the trials, raising the possibility that subjects may have adopted a
strategy of actively suppressing the representation of the uncued
memory item in order to prevent false alarm responses to this
item. Active suppression of information is arguably different from
passive retention of information (Luck and Sawaki, 2011), making
it difficult to interpret their decoding results as reflective of the
retention state of UMIs. More work is needed to understand how
active suppression and the certainty of a UMI’s relevance might
affect active neural representations for a transiently unattended
memory item.
DISCUSSION
REPRESENTATIONAL STATES IN SHORT-TERMMEMORY (STM),
REPRISED
We have considered several prominent theoretical models of STM,
several behavioral and neurophysiological studies motivated by
those models, and a series of studies employing MVPA to more
directly assay neural representations in STM. The primary finding
from MVPA studies from our group (Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012)
and LaRocque et al. (2013) is that active neural representations are
present for items in the FoA, but not for items in aLTM. This result
confirms the strong distinction drawn by all three STM models
between information selected by the FoA and information being
retained outside the FoA (Cowan, 1988; McElree, 1998; Oberauer,
2002).
We now turn our attention to points on which the three
theoretical models diverge. Highly sensitive multivariate analyses
of EEG and fMRI measures of neural activity found no evidence
for active neural representations of UMIs (Lewis-Peacock et al.,
2012; LaRocque et al., 2013). This result seems to be at odds
with the proposal that there is a state in STM with intermediate
levels of activation (i.e., aLTM) between the FoA and the massive
network of latent LTM (Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 2002). However,
we do not suggest that this result falsifies those models; rather, we
propose that this result should be taken as a call for clarification of
what is meant by “activated” as used by these theoretical accounts
of STM. The original formulation was intended to demarcate
STM from the immense network of latent LTM representations,
but based on the results reviewed here, cognitive activation
described in these models does not map directly onto neural
activation. Rather than referring to such items as being retained in
the “activated” portion of LTM, a word more in keeping with the
function of STM—such as “accessible”—might be more appro-
priate to describe STM items outside the FoA. Crucially, we do not
take these results as evidence for an isomorphism between aLTM
and latent LTM, as suggested by the McElree (2006) model. We
will return to this point momentarily, when we discuss possible
neurophysiological mechanisms for the retention of UMIs.
An important question to address is whether the results
reviewed here support the distinction drawn by Oberauer
between the FoA and an intermediate SDA. The probe-based
neuroimaging studies of Nee and Jonides (2008, 2011, 2013) do
support a distinction in the retrieval-associated neural activity
associated with memory probes to items in those two states (but
see Oztekin et al., 2010). However, a description of the activation
level of these neural representations during the retention interval
is still wanting. In our retrocuing paradigm, subjects only retained
one item outside the FoA, the UMI, which was presumably in
aLTM (Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012; LaRocque et al., 2013). There-
fore, we cannot conclusively address the activation level of neural
representations in the SDA.
While we cannot conclusively speak to the activation level of
the SDA, the study of Emrich et al. (2013) does provide a hint,
in that evidence for active neural representations was lower (but
still above baseline) as the STM load increased from one to three.
Though this study did not explicitly control for the allocation
of attention, the presence of an intermediate level of evidence
for high-load memory items can be taken as consistent with the
existence of an intermediate-activation-level SDA in which items
in the high-load condition were retained. However, because the
allocation of attention was not precisely controlled, another possi-
bility is that all three items were in the FoA simultaneously. While
we cannot conclusively adjudicate between these two interpreta-
tions, either one would contradict the one-item FoA posited by
McElree’s model. (Note, however, that recently McElree’s studies
have allowed that the FoA may not be limited to one item on
tasks in which the items are presented simultaneously (Oztekin
et al., 2010)). Indeed, the decoding results from Lewis-Peacock
et al. (2012) and LaRocque et al. (2013) also contradict a one-
item FoA, in that before the retrocue, there is evidence in the trial-
averaged results for simultaneous active neural representations of
both items in memory.
The absence of evidence for active neural representations of
UMIs is consistent with one aspect of McElree’s model, in that
he characterizes all memory representations outside the FoA as
existing in a passive state of retention (McElree, 2006). While
we appreciate his suggestion of a common storage substrate for
aLTM and latent LTM, we still question McElree’s suggestion that
the state of the information in aLTM is qualitatively identical
(aside from varying memory strength) to all other LTM items.
To encapsulate our objection with a concrete example, it seems
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unlikely that the seconds-old neural representation of the first
word presented in a list of words is in the same state as the
LTM representation the subject may have of the salutation the
experimenter used in greeting her 30 min earlier. In particular,
we note that decades of neuropsychological studies of patients
with anterograde amnesia (which can often be secondary to MTL
damage) dissociate those two states of memory. Patients with
anterograde amnesia are able to remember recently presented
items from a list, so long as that list does not exceed their STM
span. They would not, however, be able to remember a greeting
they had received 30 min previously, which a healthy control
subject would have no trouble recalling. This is because the latter
example requires encoding the greeting as an episodic memory in
LTM, whereas briefly remembering a list of words does not. Typi-
cally, the intact STM in anterograde amnesics has been explained
by an active rehearsal or refreshing mechanism; but this account
suggests a state for the information that is readily refreshable, as
conceptualized in Oberauer’s SDA (Oberauer, 2005). [We note
that much recent research has shown that STM (and, indeed,
perception) can be shown to be compromised in patients with
MTL lesions in certain behavioral paradigms, especially those
with novel or complex stimuli (Olsen et al., 2012; Rose et al.,
2012; Yonelinas, 2013). However, the basic finding that patients
with MTL lesions have relatively unimpaired STM coexisting with
near-complete anterograde amnesia is still intact].
The previous example of a patient with anterograde amnesia
brings up an issue very germane for discussions of STM and
LTM: what is the role of MTL in STM? The literature addressing
this topic is large and evolving, but it seems clear that the long-
standing notion that the MTL is only involved in LTM is an over-
simplification. Especially notable is that distraction during a short
retention interval can interfere with the performance of patients
with MTL lesions on STM tasks (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997;
Rose et al., 2012). Integrating these results into the framework
of the STM models we have discussed hinges on the theoretical
interpretation of the distractor’s effect in those paradigms. One
interpretation is that the FoA automatically selects the distracting
stimuli, thereby deselecting the memoranda. This interpretation
would suggest that impairment on this task in patients with
MTL damage is evidence for MTL involvement in the retention
of information outside the FoA. Another interpretation emerges
from recent work highlighting a critical role of MTL in the rep-
resentation (both mnemonic and perceptual) of complex and/or
novel stimuli, specifically in the binding of features within an item
and the binding of items to their task contexts (for reviews, see
Olsen et al., 2012; Yonelinas, 2013). Distraction may unmask this
deficit by preventing rote rehearsal of the memoranda, regardless
of whether the memoranda are in the FoA (e.g., if a research
participant can use subarticulatory rehearsal to maintain verbal
memoranda, there is no need to bind the memoranda to their
context because they are the only items being actively retained or
processed, and so there is little chance of a misbinding error). At
this time, it is unclear if the sensitivity to distraction in patients
with MTL damage should be construed as relating to a deficit in
attention, binding, or both. One way to resolve this controversy
would be to use a retrocuing task in a study of MTL lesion
patients; a selective impairment in memory for UMIs relative to
healthy controls would suggest a role for MTL in STM for items
outside the FoA.
We have suggested that the gradually decreasing accessibility
of less recently seen memory items need not correspond to an
episodic, hippocampus-dependent memory state as suggested by
McElree (McElree, 2006; Oztekin et al., 2010). Indeed, it seems
more parsimonious to us to envision that there is a preexisting
set of LTM representations which, after being selected and then
deselected by the FoA, are transiently more accessible due to
some property of the representation, without ever invoking the
hippocampus or episodic retrieval. This mechanism could be
“passive”, in the sense that it may not rely on heightened neural
activity, yet be distinct from the mechanism of long-term potenti-
ation thought to support LTM. This naturally raises the question:
what sort of neurophysiological mechanism could support such a
property?
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF SHORT-TERM RETENTION
OUTSIDE THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION
The results of Lewis-Peacock et al. (2012) and LaRocque et al.
(2013) cannot address the neurophysiological mechanism by
which UMIs might be retained, if not by the canonical mecha-
nism of reverberatory activity in a network of stimulus-sensitive
neurons (Hebb, 1949). However, there are plausible alternative
models of short-term retention that do not rely on elevated neural
activity as the sole mechanism for information retention. First,
recent work in mice has shown that knocking out the GluR1
subunit of the AMPA receptor results in a selective defect in
STM (Sanderson et al., 2009). Slice electrophysiology experiments
subsequently showed that this mutant also had a deficit in short-
term potentiation (STP; Erickson et al., 2009). STP induction
protocols are very brief (∼60 ms), with potentiation onset within
2–3 s of induction, and produce synaptic potentiation that decays
very quickly (on the order of a minute). All these properties make
STP a plausible mechanism for the retention of UMIs. A similar
proposal has been made regarding a transient elevation of calcium
concentration in the presynaptic neuron, which also possesses
the traits of rapid instantiation and a moderately slow decay that
would be required for any mechanistic account of STM (Mongillo
et al., 2008).
At the systems level, one model of STM-by-transient-synaptic-
modification employs a “matched filter” mechanism whereby
the information stored in a network of transiently potentiated
synapses could be reinstated as a pattern of neural activity. In this
scheme, a network of transiently potentiated synapses in inferior
temporal cortex can act as a matched filter, thereby providing an
enhanced neural response to inputs matching the input that first
instantiated the synaptic weights (Sugase-Miyamoto et al., 2008).
Evidence for a similar scheme also comes from a multivariate
analysis of neuronal activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC), in which
“implicit” changes in synaptic weights adaptively code moment-
to-moment changes in behavioral context (Stokes et al., 2013).
Notably, a mechanism such as this implies information storage
within a network defined by a distributed pattern of synaptic
weights, which is how LTM storage is typically understood.
Although the neuroimaging data that we have reviewed in this
report do not speak directly to the cellular- and systems-level
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models summarized in this and the preceding paragraph, we can
nonetheless observe that our data are consistent with these types
of mechanisms supporting the short-term retention of UMIs.
One question that has been posed to us repeatedly in dis-
cussing the results of LaRocque et al. (2013) and Lewis-Peacock
et al. (2012) is some variant of the following: “How can you be
sure that STM without an active neural representation isn’t really
just LTM?”. We confess that this question is vexing, because it
seems to emerge from circular definitions. STM has a distinct
behavioral definition—it refers to the retention of information
over a short delay in order to guide behavior. LTM also has a
distinct behavioral definition—the long-term retention of infor-
mation that is not presently being used to guide behavior. In
our opinion, the terminology used to describe neurophysiological
mechanisms should be clearly demarcated from the description of
behavior, because there is no prima facie reason to mandate that
separate mechanisms must be used to support retention across
different intervals of time. Indeed, recent work has challenged the
notion that purported “STM” and “LTM” mechanisms can be
cleanly separated (Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005; Rose et al.,
2012). Even if separate neural mechanisms are often observed
supporting the retention of information across different intervals,
the interpretation of such distinctions suffers by conflating the
terminologies for behavior and neurophysiology. In discussing
neurophysiological mechanisms of memory, we prefer to use
language suggested by O’Reilly et al. (2012), and refer to “weight-
based” and “activity-based” mechanisms. Storage based on synap-
tic modifications, like STP, is weight-based, whereas storage based
on sustained neural firing, such as a Hebbian “reverberatory
trace” (Hebb, 1949), is inherently activity-based. Therefore, to
return to the question of how to categorize UMIs, we suggest
that UMIs and AMIs are both “in” STM, where the retention of
information may be accomplished via weight-based mechanisms
for the former and via activity-based mechanisms for the latter.
Having considered neuroimaging studies of memory probe-
evoked activity (Nee and Jonides, 2008, 2011, 2013; Oztekin et al.,
2010), retrocue-evoked activity (Griffin and Nobre, 2003; Nobre
et al., 2004; Lepsien and Nobre, 2007), and delay-period activity
(Lepsien and Nobre, 2007; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012; Trapp and
Lepsien, 2012; Nelissen et al., 2013; Emrich et al., 2013; LaRocque
et al., 2013), the weight of the evidence suggests that there are
multiple representational states in STM. Specifically, we argue that
the neural evidence is supportive of those models that posit the
simultaneous, (neurophysiologically) active short-term retention
of multiple items, either in a multi-item FoA (Cowan, 1995) or an
SDA (Oberauer, 2002). The studies we have reviewed also suggest
a constraint for theoretical models of STM; namely, that STM, per
se, may not require elevated neural activity, and that attention is
the primary determinant of the presence of neurophysiologically
active representations in STM.
ATTENTION AND RETENTION: LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT WORK
AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In the course of our discussion of attention and states in
STM, we have highlighted results obtained from MVPA of neu-
ral data. Though we have argued for the increased sensitivity
and inferential power of MVPA compared to traditional signal-
intensity-based analyses, we note that MVPA has several
important limitations. First, it is limited by the type of neural
data used to train the classifier. MVPA applied to fMRI or EEG
measures of neural activity can glean information from subtle
patterns of neural activity, but it is insensitive to processes that are
not manifested in EEG or fMRI measures. For example, a classifier
trained on BOLD signal would be insensitive to information
contained in inter-region patterns of connectivity or in a spike-
timing-dependent neural code (though classifiers could certainly
be trained on those data). A second potential limitation of MVPA
is the possibility that the patterns of neural activity measured
by fMRI and EEG are epiphenomenal, and do not directly assay
the neural representations that are important in the guidance of
behavior. Though this is an important scenario to keep in mind,
we consider it to be unlikely, especially because of the results
we have discussed that show correlations between patterns of
neural activity in sensory cortex and task performance (Emrich
et al., 2013; Ester et al., 2013). A potential topic for future study
would be to test the relationship of MVPA evidence to behavior
by perturbing patterns of neural activity with a perturbational
method, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation, and observing
the resultant behavioral effects. For further reviews of the limi-
tations of MVPA as applied to neural data, see Tong and Pratte
(2012) and Davis and Poldrack (2013).
One of the intriguing suggestions of the neuroimaging studies
of STM with retrocues reviewed above is that the neural activity
observed during the delay period of a STM task may be more
related to the allocation of attention to information, rather than
to the retention of information, per se. In order to reach this
conclusion, it was important to explicitly control the allocation of
attention. It follows from this that many studies of STM that lack
such explicit control of attention may have inadvertently conflated
short-term retention with attention. Many studies have recently
ascribed properties to STM that might in fact relate more closely
to the FoA. Examples of such conclusions from the recent litera-
ture include: the contents of STM alter the detection thresholds
of memory-matching stimuli and the size of a neurophysiological
marker of visual awareness, the P300 (Melloni et al., 2011); STM
can influence perception by shifting the perceived direction of
motion of a moving stimulus away from a remembered direction
(motion repulsion) (Kang et al., 2011); and information retained
in STM can influence the perception of an ambiguous stimulus
(Scocchia et al., 2013). In each of these cases, the items retained
in STM were also presumably in the FoA, raising the possibility
that the properties ascribed to STM may more directly relate to
attention. A potentially fruitful topic for further study will be the
disambiguation of properties of STM and attention applied to
items in STM.
We have defined AMIs and UMIs by the differential allocation
of attention to information in STM. In the study of consciousness,
a topic of ongoing debate is how the allocation of attention relates
to conscious awareness. This debate led us to wonder about the
status of AMIs and UMIs with respect to conscious awareness.
Except for certain conditions of perceptual suppression (e.g.,
with binocular rivalry), information selected by the FoA typically
becomes the content of consciousness (see, e.g., Table 1 in Koch
and Tsuchiya, 2006). A more tangled question is how information
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in STM, but not currently selected by the FoA, might relate
to conscious awareness. To begin untangling this question, we
should note that, though we have called the memory items “unat-
tended”, the use of this term is intended to draw contrast with
the unequivocally prioritized and attended item that was cued in
the retrocuing tasks (Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012; LaRocque et al.,
2013). It could indeed be the case that no attention is allocated
to UMIs. Alternatively, it could be that attention is periodically,
briefly allocated, or even that a very small amount of attention is
continuously allocated to “UMIs”. Finding evidence to distinguish
these possibilities is empirically possible, albeit challenging. Each
of the three scenarios could be true for different subjects, or across
different trials for a single subject. This difficulty in conclusively
describing items purportedly outside the FoA mirrors an ongoing
debate in the study of visual awareness as to whether it is possible
to be conscious of a stimulus with no attention allocated to that
stimulus; in that literature, it has remained hotly debated because
of the difficulty inherent in creating a “no-attention” condition
(Koch and Tsuchiya, 2006; Van Boxtel et al., 2010; Cohen et al.,
2011). STM items in the FoA can be considered to be isomorphic
with the contents of consciousness (Baars and Franklin, 2003;
Buchsbaum, 2013). If UMIs are indeed outside the FoA, perhaps
they can also be considered to be transiently outside conscious
awareness, though still consciously accessible. After all, the behav-
ioral criterion for STM is that it should be consciously accessible
after a delay period (but see Soto et al., 2011 for a possible example
of STM without conscious awareness). Another possibility is that
UMIs may be in conscious awareness, and that they therefore
represent another dissociation of attention and awareness. These
distinctions between attention and awareness are important, and
they could provide a fruitful way to understand the various states
of transiently retained information. Our findings point to the
importance of controlling attention in STM tasks. Closer control
of attention and awareness during tests of STM could provide a
means to productively address the problem of states of represen-
tation in STM, and to build models that more comprehensively
encompass the theoretical and the neural mechanisms underlying
and supporting STM.
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